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Abstract 
The framework of private property theory has come under increasing scrutiny over 
recent years. The orthodox bundle theory of ownership and labour principle of first 
acquisition has been the subject of attack and scepticism. This discussion suggests a 
new approach to the analysis of property, focus on synthesis rather than contrast.  
Further, the classic differences between Roman Law and Anglo-American common 
law, it is argued here, are in fact more apparent than real – their similarities reveal 
the basis for a universal grammar in property discourse. An examination of the 
contemporary property theories identifies that it is time to shift focus to a unifying 
concept and synthesis of canonical concepts. 
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Introduction 
The scene for this discussion may best be set by the words of Sir William Blackstone: 
 There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination and engages the 
 affections of mankind, as the right of property; … [yet few] will give 
 themselves the trouble to consider the original and foundation of this right. 
 Pleased as we are with possession … we think it enough that our title is 
 derived by the grant of the former proprietor … not caring to reflect that there 
 is no foundation in nature … why a set of words on parchment should 
 convey the dominion of land’2 
 
                                                          
1 Jonathan expects soon to qualify as a solicitor, he is currently working as a senior lawyer in 
recognised private practice and nearing completion of the Legal Practice Course. In January 
2016 he commences a PhD with Plymouth University entitled Geothermal Technology and 
the Challenge of Property Rights. He is the winner of The Gard and Co Solicitors Prize for the 
Best Law Graduate, 2015 and has been placed on the Dean’s List. He is also the winner of 
the Wolferstans Best Property Law Student Prize. He can be contacted at 
jonathan.t.ward@students.plymouth.ac.uk. 
2 Blackstone, W. Commentaries on the Laws of England: Book 2 The Rights of Things, (2015 
Digital Reprint, Amazon UK). 
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These questions agitated critics before and after Blackstone and over the centuries a 
canon of thought emerged; that common and civilian models of property cannot be 
reconciled. Lines were drawn between the naturalists, the utilitarians and the 
libertarians. Property Rights have been dubbed bundles of sticks3 and even 
subatomic particles.4 
 
The orthodox theory that property is a bundle of rights and incidents, such as the 
right to exclude and the right to income,5 has recently come under attack from 
emerging univocal modelslinking the person and the thing.6  The academic players 
are now bundle theorists or anti bundle theorists. 
 
The object of this article is to rationalise this debate; it proposes a new focus, that of 
synthesis and pluralism. The thesis is that there is a universal grammar behind 
property discourse. The entrenched distinctions between civilian and common law 
property systems are more apparent than real and the rationale for this lies in the 
philosophical justifications for acquisition of property. 
 
This discussion commences with structural examination of rights in rem and the 
distinctions between bundle and univocal theories. Against this background it then 
challenges the canonical view of the differences between Roman and Anglo-
American common law property institutions. Finally, it proposes a pluralist approach 
to justifications of private property systems. 
 
1 On Distinguishing Rights in Rem and Rights in Personam 
These terms are borrowed from Roman Classical law7 but function differently in that 
Roman lawyers would not have spoken of rights or iura in a way recogniseable to 
common lawyers.8 Instead interests in a res were protected by actio legio in rem and 
personal interests arising from for example a contract or delict, by actio in personam.  
It is within the action that the right lay – ‘actio autem’ says Justinian ‘nihil aliud est, 
                                                          
3 Cardozo, B.N., The Paradoxes of Legal Science (1928) p.129. 
4 Lewis, D., 2 Philosophical Papers (1987), ix. 
5 Honoré, A.M., ‘Ownership’, in Guest, A.G., Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (1961). 
6 Penner, J., The Idea of Property in Law, (2003, Oxford, OUP). 
7 Sandars, T.C., The Institutes of Justinian, (1853, Digital Reprint Amazon UK) p.48 para.64 
(Hereafter Inst. Just.). 
8 Buckland, W.W. and MacNair, A.D., Roman Law and Common Law, (2008, New York, 
Cambridge University Press), p.89. 
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quam jus persequendi judicio quod sibi debetur.’9 This is conceptually discreet from 
Anglo – American common law where a right must exist to ground an action.10  
 
In common law, the distinction is analogous to that of real rights and personal rights; 
the former availing against all the world as regards a thing and the latter against a 
specific person or persons. They may be regarded respectively as proprietary rights 
and as obligations.11   
 
Hohfeld termed rights in personam as paucital rights; unique rights residing in one 
person and availing against one or a small determinate number of persons. He 
regarded rights in rem as multital rights, a class of ‘fundamentally similar yet 
separate’ rights held by an individual but availing against a large and ‘indefinite class’ 
of persons.12 In contrast to Austin’s suggestion13 that one right exists binding people 
universally or generally, Hohfeld argued there are many individual rights binding a 
large number of people but individually as to each party. This reduces a multital right 
to a bundle of rights in personam, the distinguishing feature between the two being 
that a multital right is a paucital right with many companion paucital rights. Yet 
Hohfeld offers no explanation for this distinction. This may be called the quantitative 
analysis of rights in rem. Campbell identifies a corollary of this analysis; that rights in 
rem are non-substitutionally accretive, so by operation of law the right will hold 
against other persons, irrespective of whether it has ceased to hold against 
another.14 Penner, albeit objecting to this analysis, suggests that where A transfers 
Blackacre to B, all the duties owed by all the world to A necessarily change to be 
owed to B.15 Campbell’s proposition appears sound if the quantitative analysis is 
accepted but, it does not resolve the flaw identified. Qualitative analysis is required. 
Rights in rem are primarily negative or prohibitory in nature (‘primarily’ is an important 
qualification, the two are not definitively bifurcated in this way, consider contractual 
rights which impose negative obligations) where rights in personam impose positive 
                                                          
9 Inst. Just. p.526 ‘An action is nothing else than the right of suing before a judge for that 
which is due to us’. 
10 See Grantham, R.B., and Rickett, C.E.F., ‘Property Rights as a Legally Significant Event’, 
(2003) 62 The Cambridge Law Journal 03, pp.717-749.  
11 Grantham and Rickett, Property, p.728. 
12 Hohfeld W.N., Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied in Judicial Reasoning, (1964, 
Connecticut, Greenwood Press) p.72. 
13 Austin, J., Lectures on Jurisprudence or the Philosophy of Positive Law, (1869, reprint 2012 
London, Forgotten Books) p.383. 
14 Campbell, K., ‘On The General Nature of Property Rights’, (1992) Kings College Law 
Journal 3, p.88. 
15 Penner, J., The Idea of Property in Law, (2003, Oxford, OUP) p.23.  
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obligations.16 In English land law, two examples spring to mind viz generally positive 
covenants cannot bind the land and drainage easements cannot impose positive 
obligations on the servient owner to maintain the drain, either obligation would 
necessarily be in personam.17 The distinction is between substance and form.  Rights 
to light or rights to support are seemingly positive rights in rem. Yet they are rights of 
non-interference. There is no positive obligation on the servient tenement to provide 
light or support, simply a requirement not to interfere therewith. 
 
Caution is needed - there are exceptions, for example a right to have a fence 
maintained.18 Gale dislikes the treatment of this as an easement but it is accepted by 
the Courts and may be obtained by grant, statute or prescription.19   
 
Whilst easements generally cannot impose positive obligations, such as to repair the 
drain above, there can be a resulting obligation; if X has a right to lay pipes over 
Blackacre, he must keep them watertight, to allow water or otherwise to escape is 
trespass.20 This obligation is arguably grounded in branches of law outside the law of 
property21 (although the individuation of property law might be an exercise in 
conceptual simplification) but betrays a symmetry, or at least a rational and dialectic 
relationship, between rights and duties. It erodes the idea that rights in rem are 
distinguished by their exclusionary character. The exceptions do no violence to the 
nature of the rule, in fact they may be part of it.22 Furthermore, the obligation 
operates whether or not pipes are laid. The duty not to trespass is correlative, if 
anything, with the right in rem of the owner of Blackacre. The laying of pipes might 
present an opportunity for trespass but the obligation not to is analytically prior to the 
opportunity.  
 
                                                          
16 Honoré, A., M., ‘Rights of Exclusion and Immunities Against Divesting’, (1960) Tulane Law 
Review 34, 453, p.460 suggests a restriction on trade covenant 
17Tulk v Moxhay (1848) 41 ER 1143; Duke of Westminster v Guild (1985) QB 688, a useful 
discussion of which may be found in Birks, P., ‘Five Keys to Land Law’ in Bright, S., and 
Dewar, J., Land Law Themes and Perspectives (2008, Oxford, OUP) at p.470. 
18 See Jones v Price [1965] 2 QB 618; 3 WLR 296; 2 ALL ER 625 CA, Crow v Wood [1971] 1 
QB 77;  [1970] 3 WLR 516. 
19 Gaunt, J., and Morgan, P., Gale On Easements Nineteenth Edition, (2012, 19th edition, 
London, Sweet and Maxwell) p.46; S.62 Law of Property Act 1925, see Egerton v Harding 
[1975] QB 62; [1974] 3 WLR 437; 3 ALL ER 689; Jones v Price [1965] 2 QB 618; 3 WLR 296; 
2 ALL ER 625 CA. 
20 Gale, Easements, p.55 quoting Sir John Romilly M R in Ingram v Morecraft [1863] 33 Beav 
49 at 51,52.  
21 Lawson, F.H., and Rudden, B., The Law of Property, (2010, Oxford, Clarendon) pp.90-91 
and p.63; see Penner, Idea, at p.32 et seq on the individuation of property law. 
22 Schauer, F., ‘Exceptions’, 58 Chicago LR (1991) 871 at 893. 
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The argument, even when expressed subtly differently (and persuasively), that rights 
in rem are protected by ‘claims to abstentions’ or ‘a general prohibition of 
interference’ in contrast to positive performance obligations, is not infallible- all 
prohibitions (negative obligations) could be expressed positively. A duty to forbear 
requires a positive decision not to act when the opportunity presents. Eleftheriadis 
argues that a duty to forbear and a duty to act are both a species of obligation and so 
are of the same deontic character, in that the duty to forbear from x is the same as 
the positive duty to do not-x. This is incorrect. Where x describes an action bringing 
about a change and entails the duty to not-x being regarded as a duty to do a not-
change, then the duty must be that the duty-bearer should actively prevent a change 
in a state of affairs. Correctly expressed, the duty is to not-do x.23   
 
If X transfers Blackacre to Y, prior to which transfer C was present on Blackacre by 
way of licence, C was not interfering with any right in rem. At the point of transfer, C 
has a duty in rem not to interfere with Y’s right in rem. The position changes, C 
involuntarily becomes a trespasser. His normative action, or obligation, is now 
positive, he must remove himself from Blackacre. This is significant in adverse 
possession and was the issue in JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham.24 Graham’s 
occupation was originally lawful, he occupied by way of licence in personam. His 
licence came to an end but his occupation continued whereupon he became a 
trespassor de jure and de facto. Was the higher duty on Graham to vacate the land 
or on Pye to take action to remove him? By remaining on the land, Graham’s 
occupation matured into a species of right. Until maturity it could be said he was the 
subject of a duty, the significance is the character of the duty. 
 
A better view is to identify the independence inherent in a right in rem as distinct from 
a right in personam. The former normatively survives alienation, the latter, without 
more, does not. Honoré regards this ‘immunity from divesting’ as a defining 
characteristic of the distinction between rights in rem and in personam.25  
 
The right in rem might survive the alienation of the res, but it cannot survive its 
destruction.26 The reverse is true for a right in personam; viz if Cicero grants a 
                                                          
23 Eleftheriadis, P., ‘Analysis of Property Rights’, (1996) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
16(1), 32 p.48; Honoré, Exclusion, p.458, at p.463 suggests that if non-interference amounts 
to co-operation then this is a positive act. 
24 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2002] UKHL 30. 
25 Honoré Exclusion, p.465. 
26 Birks 1985 49-50, referred to in Penner, Idea, p.31. 
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licence of a seat (a right in personam) in his theatre to Chrysippus and the seat is 
destroyed by Proudhon (in protest that this stands for all ancient philosophy has to 
say of property),27 it is reasonable for Chrysippus to regard Cicero’s duty 
undischarged.28  However, unless Proudhon had merely stolen the seat, it is absurd 
for Cicero to claim a right in rem against Proudhon, for there is no res in which to 
ground the right, such a claim must be in personam, therefore the right in rem cannot 
survive the destruction of the res.29  This stands for two propositions; (1) a 
distinguishing feature of rights in rem and in personam is exigeability. As to the 
former it is located in the res and the latter in a defined person;30 (2) a direct jural 
relationship between persons and things.       
 
Three viable lines of enquiry arise; (1) the role and structural locus of the protective 
claim; (2) the correlativity of the duty; (3) closer analysis of exigeability. 
 
Honoré suggests the distinction between the claims protecting rights in rem and in 
personam is that the correlative duty in the former arises out of a general title, being 
a subject of a legal system, where any other title, as in the latter, is particular and 
need not apply to all subjects.31 This restates the assertion that rights in rem bind 
indefinite numbers and in personam specific numbers of persons- it is a species of 
Hohfeldian bilateral claim/duty argument. However, it suggests that the duty in rem is 
not directly correlative with the right in rem.32 Penner’s analysis, whilst departing from 
orthodoxy, is alluring; to owe separate individual duties to individual owners, it must 
be possible to identify the owner and the extent of their property. It is neither possible 
nor necessary, therefore, there is one single duty held by individuals not to interfere 
with the property of others, generally.33   
 
                                                          
27 Proudhon, P.J., What is Property? An inquiry into the principle of right and Government’, 
(Amazon UK reproduction, undated) xlii. 
28 Birks, Five Keys. 
29 Penner, Idea, p31. This vignette is an abridged version of Birks’ in ib id whose protagonist 
was Daisy the cow. 
30 Birks, Five Keys p.473. 
31 Honoré, Exclusion, p.456. 
32 Honoré does not use the term Duty in Rem but Penner does (Idea p.26) and Eleftheriadis 
does so too, Analysis, p.51. 
33 Penner, Idea, p.27. 
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An asymmetry is clear between rights and duties in rem. This non-Hohfeldian 
conclusion can be made out. If the duty and right in rem are not directly correlative, 
then something is required to mediate between the two. This surely, is the res itself.34  
 
It is not the res but the right in rem which grounds action. Yet how can it be said to be 
breached if there is no correlative duty? Is the right in rem inert? It is submitted that it 
is not. It should be regarded as a primary or institutional right, protected by a 
secondary or remedial right in personam to institute a claim against a specific 
trespasser.35 This right is in addition to rather than instead of the supervening right in 
rem; Penner’s objection that proximity should not dictate the nature of the right is 
met.36 This resembles the vindicatio action in Roman law. The character of the right 
in rem lying behind a claim is significant in terms of equitable remedy. The 
proprietary character of the right attracts proprietary remedy. Without this distinction, 
breaches might attract damages only; more a species of boobie prize than a 
remedy.37 The corollary is that the right in rem is of higher normative order,38 or, that 
it is the core right, where the remedial in personam right is derivative.39 
 
The issue whether a right in rem is a right to a thing or a relation of right and duty 
between subjects (agents) persists but is readily disposed of. Possession of property 
is a close, factual, physical nexus or relationship between agent and property. It may 
even be legally significant. It is not, without more, a legal relationship, which requires 
the normative force of an abstract right. This right is meaningless unless it regulates 
relations between persons. These relations are always res centric. The role of the res 
distinguishes rights in rem and in personam. The argument about exigibility appears 
sound and these are rights between persons in respect of things.40 
 
Comparison between rights and duty based theories illuminates the distinction 
between in rem and in personam.41 The relationship between rights and duties may 
be justificatory rather than one of logical equivalence, resonant of the Kantian view 
                                                          
34 See Penner, Idea, Harris, J. M., Property and Justice, (2003, Oxford, OUP), Birks, Five 
Keys. 
35 Grantham and Rickett, Property Rights suggest the order of the court is remedial. 
36 Penner, Idea, p.31. 
37 That is not to say that rights in personam cannot admit proprietary remedy. 
38 See von Wright, G.H., Norm and Action: A Logical Enquiry, (1963, Oxford, Basil Blackwell) 
and discussion herein. 
39 Raz, J., ‘On the Nature of Rights’, (1984) Mind Vol. XCIII, 194-214 p.198. 
40 Munzer, S., R., A Theory of Property, (1992, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press) so 
called sophisticated conception at p.17. 
41 Waldron, Private Property, pp.62-73. 
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that people are naturally inclined to submit to legal discipline; this shapes the duty 
based paradigm.42  The point is that a right is derivative from a deeper, or higher, 
duty. Rawls’ analysis of principles of natural duty and obligation supports this – he 
identifies a natural duty to support just institutions.43 This presupposes that property 
is both an institution and a just one; but if true, the view supports the conceptual 
analysis proffered earlier, that rights in rem are a (species of) higher order of norm; 
the duty exists howsoever property and ownership is organised in any momentary 
legal system. Property rights are a response to a natural duty.  
 
Dworkin makes a similar distinction adding a goal based criteria applied to property 
rights, suggesting the goal is the fundamental component in analysis, that being of 
socially efficient land use.44 Dworkin does not adequately apply his own analysis; he 
correctly identifies that where standards of behaviour are the primary concern, a duty 
based argument is appropriate but he should apply this to property rights broadly, the 
socially efficient use of land is a fractional component of the property institutions.45 If 
the goal is of such wide application, it contributes to a more fundamental duty and is 
consistent with a duty based argument, if this is so then the right is derived from the 
duty.   
 
Raz insists that rights are grounds for duties which damages this thesis. In applying 
his analysis to promises and agreements, his argument is unassailable.46 This 
attracts analysis of rights based theory, which prescribes an application of a code of 
conduct to individual interests and persons, should they seek to enjoy its protection.47 
This requires consent, in the absence of which a clear objection manifests that such 
a theory is vulnerable to give rise to competing rights.48 Nozick posits that in such 
circumstances the duty is to act (or presumably forbear) so as to not violate another’s 
rights. For no matter how much an agent may prevent the interference of the right by 
others, he may not interfere with it himself.49 This does not answer the objection and 
in fact supports a duty based theory. A better view is that right based theory lends 
                                                          
42 Kant, I (Transl. Beck, L.,) Critique of Practical Reason, (1975, Indiana, Bobbs Merrill) pp.81-
86. 
43 Rawls, J., Theory of Justice, (1999, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press) p.98. 
44 Dworkin, R., Taking Rights Seriously (1977, London, Duckworth) p.171. 
45 This view is proffered by the author.  It is interesting that Waldron, Private Property (at 
pp.71 and 73) does not notice, or does not mind, that Dworkin in fact expressly excludes 
property rights from his duty based theory. 
46 Raz, Nature, p.199. 
47 Dworkin, Rights p.176. 
48 Waldron ,Private Property, p.76. 
49 Nozick, R., Anarchy State and Utopia,(1992, Oxford, Blackwell) p.29. 
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itself to individual self-interest. For example, duties flowing from a contract are per se 
derivative of the rights created consensually by the contract. The analytical starting 
point is the entitlement of the beneficiary, the correlative duty is instrumental and 
specific.50 This appears consistent with Raz’s analysis that a duty becomes specific 
when it becomes operative. In the case of rights in rem, the duty is always and 
generally operative, does not require an event and is not a species of response.  
That is not to say that the rights which are derived are not an event or the rights 
which protect them are not a response, it is to say that the focus is the duty (viz the 
duty is analytically and philosophically prior) and therefore a duty-based analysis is 
appropriate.     
 
Rights in personam attract a rights-based theory analysis. The duties are grounded 
by the rights. The duties are not operative until an occasion arises for their 
performance and such occasion cannot arise until the right presents. 
 
Waldron posits a benefit-theory. To establish a primary right it must be the case that 
a rule exists for the purpose of securing a benefit which forms the character of the 
right. It grounds the duty but does not impose it.51 This reinforces the view that rights 
and duties need not be correlative.   
 
Philosophical, conceptual and logical distinctions exist rights in rem and in personam, 
which derive from myriad characteristics; yet the common denominator is the idea 
that rights in rem are a species of higher norm. The distinction is significant, not only 
structurally and in terms of an understanding of the nature of property and property 
rights but because in pointing to a natural or higher order of right, it commands an 
analysis of the justifications of property and the acquisition thereof as well as whether 
property is a singular right in rem or in fact a bundle or series of rights, powers to 
exclude trespassers and privileges. 
                                                          
50 Dworkin, Rights, at p.172 suggests the code of conduct is instrumental, from which it could 
be said the duty created by the code of conduct and engaged by the contract, is instrumental. 
51 Waldron, Private Property, p.82. 
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2 On the Distinction Between Roman Law and Anglo-American 
 Common Law and Property as a Bundle of Rights – or dominium 
 and ownership 
For all its naïveté, the popular conception that something belongs to someone 
introduces the concept of private property, from which the idea of ownership is 
derived.52 This may be seen in Roman law; ‘priuate sunt’ says Gaius ‘quae 
singulorum sunt.’53 Notably, ‘singulorum’ is in the genitive or possessive case.  The 
literal translation is ‘of individuals’. This suggests unequivocal connection between 
person and thing the sense of which is ‘belonging to’.54 Roman law recognised the 
doctrine of dominium which, whilst not identical to ownership has been described as 
the ‘ultimate right to a thing, the right which had no right behind it’ yet it might have 
been a ‘mere nudum ius with no practical content.’55  Gaius proscribed ‘nam aut 
dominius quisque est aut dominus non intellegitur’56- a man is either an owner or not.  
Dominium was absolute, inviolable and indivisible.57   
 
This colours dominium as an abstract concept devoid of the relativity of title or 
doctrine of estates pervasive in Anglo-American common law, yet this is a distinction 
of form rather than substance.58 Dominium was neither unrestricted nor unqualified. 
Dominium could not be enjoyed unlawfully, so as to harm or interfere with others’ 
dominium.59 There were restrictions on development.60 Dominium was vulnerable to 
usucapio, the dominium bonitarium could claim against the dominus and longi 
temporis praescriptio became a positive mode of acquisition.61 This erodes 
inviolability.   
                                                          
52 For an interesting discussion on this see Waldron, Private Property. p.39. 
53 Muirhead, J., et al, The Institutes of Gaius and Rules of Ulpian (1880, Digital Reprint, 
Amazon) (hereafter Inst. Gai.) at p.77 ‘Those are private that belong to individuals’. 
54 The, rather rudimentary, grammar is proffered by the author – no doubt an elementary text 
such as Kennedy’s Latin Primer would develop this.  The literal translation is also proffered by 
the author.  Professor Muirhead’s more elegant translation is not dissimilar but it is necessary 
arguendo to reduce the statement thus. 
55 Buckland, W.W., The Main Institutions of Roman Private Law, (1931, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press) p.93 (hereafter Buckland Inst.); Buckland, W.W., A Textbook of 
Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian, (1921, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press) 
p.189 (hereafter Buckland Textbook) 
56 Inst. Gai. p.86. 
57 Nicholas, B., An Introduction to Roman Law, (1976, Oxford, Clarendon) pp.99-154. 
58 In particular the doctrine of estates. This is not rehearsed here but magisterial treatment 
may be found as to the history in Holdsworth, W., A History of English Law, (1966, London, 
Methuen)  
59 Nicholas, Introduction p.154. 
60 Getzler, J.,’Roman Ideas of Land Ownership’,in Bright, S., and Dewar, J., Land Law 
Themes and Perspectives (2008) p.85. 
61 Inst. Just. 2.6 at p.232.  Loosely, the dominium bonitarium was he who was in the process 
of acquiring dominium. 
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The indivisibility of dominium is questionable.  An owner was at liberty to grant 
servitudes (for example rights of way) over his property pactionibus stipulatoinibus.62 
Such right was then protected by actio publiciana; an action at law where the 
claimant was able to claim as if he were dominus, and thereby obtain vindicatio, a 
vindication of proprietary rights which is comparable to proprietary remedy. This is 
clear fractionation of ownership. 
 
Additionally, ‘ususfructus’, says Justinian, ‘a proprietate separationem recipit.’63 This 
unequivocally states that the usufruct may be separated from the property. It is 
difficult to approximate the usufruct with a common law concept but there are 
characteristics which it is instructive to compare. Indeed, it has been said that as the 
doctrine of estates characterises the common law, so the usufruct characterises the 
Civil law.64 The usufruct is the right of using a thing belonging to another and is itself 
capable of fractionation, for example the bare use or right to inhabit a house may be 
granted out of it.65 It is said that a usufruct was inalienable66 but this is questionable – 
‘Nec ulli’ says Justinian ‘alii jus quod habet, aut locare aut vendere aut gratis 
concedere potest; eum is qui usumfructum habet, potest haec omnia facere’.67 The 
language is significant, the literal translation refers to the usufruct ‘having the power 
to … let, sell or gift.’  Notably, the usufruct is limited in time.  
 
The Institutes refer to a usufruct granted to a legatee where, for example, the heir 
took only bare ownership subject to the usufruct of the legatee.68 Aside from the 
divisibility of ownership, this resembles life interests in English law. Alienability is 
freer in English law, but it is clear that a usufruct is divisible. Furthermore, Justinian 
prescribes that ‘placuit certis modis extengui usumfructum et ad proprietatem reverti’ 
viz there should be a means by which the usufruct may be extinguished and revert 
back to the property.69 This resembles the concept of reversion or residuarity in 
English law. 
 
                                                          
62 Inst Just. 2.3 at p.212. ‘By agreement and stipulation’, this is borrowed from Gaius.   
63 Inst Just 2.4 p.217 ‘The usufruct is detached from the property’. 
64 Nicholas, Introduction p.148. 
65 Inst Just. 2.5 at p.223. 
66 Buckland, Textbook, p.269. 
67 ‘[he who has the naked use of lands] cannot let, or sell, or give gratuitously his right to 
another, while he who has the usufruct has the power to do all of this’. 2.5 at p.223. This is 
the author’s translation and is more literal than that offered by the translator of the text. At the 
expense of some elegance, the language used by Justinian is revealing, potestas, power, is a 
strong word in Latin. 
68 ‘nam heres nudam habet proprietatem, legatarius usumfructum’ Inst Just 2.4 p.217. 
69 Inst Just p.217 at 2.4. 
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Emphyteusis, by the time of Justinian, was the grant of land to the holding 
emphyteuta forever, or long periods, in exchange for a rent. The holding was 
protected by an actio in rem. This is clearly analogous to a long lease (save as to 
perpetuity but consider the reality of a 999 year term) in English law70 and is arguably 
a species of ownership. It challenges the concept of dominium reducing it to a nudum 
ius.71 
 
Roman law, superficially, does not recognise the relativity of title characteristic of 
English law; a Roman ownership right or ius quiritiam dominius, is the best right, 
prevailing against all rival claims.  English law considers only whether the right of the 
claimant is relatively better than that of the defendant. Historically, in English law, a 
party needed to show only that he had an immediate right to possession, better than 
that of his opponent. Prior possession was probative. The probatio diabolica in 
Roman law, was the requirement of proof of absolute title; a requirement to trace an 
original mode of acquisition.72  Of course, usucapion rescued claimants from such 
undertakings. The prominent feature of usucapion is possession for a requisite 
period, and so the orthodox Anglo – Roman conceptual distinction is blurred. 
Furthermore, the possessory interdicts existed to assist the bona fide possessor 
whose claim was good against all except the true owner – a clear exception to 
notions of indivisibility and comparable with common law relativity of title.  
  
There are undoubtedly differences between Roman Law and English common law, 
particularly that the latter has no concept of dominium and the former, whose 
dominium is blind to the tertium quid of the estate or (pace usufructus) divisibility over 
planes of time, has little which is doctrinally comparable to the estate.73 Yet with the 
advent of compulsory title registration under Land Registration Act 2002, the absolute 
title which the Romans so jealously guarded and which common law institutionally 
resisted is now enshrined in common law. Ownership of land is no more and no less 
than an entry on a register of titles.74  Possession is no longer the root of title and as 
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for relativity, the register is conclusive. The true owner, unless he is the registered 
proprietor, except in limited circumstances, finds his interest at risk. 75  
 
This leads to the conclusion that the role of dominium became at least conceptual 
and more probably political rather than of practical application. The absolutism of 
Roman ownership was an exercise in instituting rational, clearly defined property 
structures facilitating trade in a liberal climate. The late 19th century heralded a 
bourgeois reform of the German legal system, a demand for equality before the law 
and legal systematic utopia providing certainty and rational ordering of land and 
ownership, in which absolute ownership was regarded as progressive and affording 
protection from the chains of feudalism.76 However this seems intended to be 
politically neutral rather than advancing capitalism. The continental lawyers turned to 
the rational prescriptions of the Roman law and consequentially dominium received 
exaggerated status as a notion of supreme power over property constrained only by 
the state who sought to uphold institutions of private property.77 Yet the entrenched 
common law property regime, which survived an industrial revolution, far from being 
undeveloped, with its sophisticated concepts of estates, relativity and division of 
proprietary rights, evolved to better respond to social, political and economic 
exigencies.78 
 
Structurally, the Roman law of dominium is an aggregate of remedies. This led to the 
intellectualisation of dominium in the post classical era as capable of reduction to the 
person with a titulus  recognised by the state and the ius utendi, fruendi, abutendi viz. 
the right to the use, the fruits and the right to abuse (in effect to consume and, 
significantly, to alienate). Justinian considered the right to use the same as the right 
to inhabit (‘de usu et habitatione’) which is consonant with possession.79 The 
divisibility of dominium reinforces this, these rights may be alienated by their owner 
but the residual interest is retained by the dominus. 
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Medieval English law attempted to reconcile dominium with the English doctrine of 
estate. Bracton, who drew greatly on the Roman law,80 recognised the divisibility of 
dominium; ‘ut si quis’ he says, ‘in fundo dominium habuerit merum ius et 
proprietatem, feodum et liberum tenementum, et usumfructum’ – ‘he who has 
dominium in an estate the mere right and the property, the fee and the free tenement 
of the usufruct.’81 The word ‘merum’ is interesting.  Whilst the direct translation is 
‘mere’ the meaning has changed since the 13th century. The word ‘pure’ is closer to 
the historic meaning of ‘mere’.82  This suggests property or ownership exists as a 
higher norm. However, the word ‘merum’ is synonymous with ‘bare’, as the nudum 
ius considered earlier and nothing is lost in literal translation. 
 
What then, of ownership in English common law. The orthodox starting point is 
Honoré’s eleven incidents of ownership. Not all incidents are advantageous to the 
right holder or owner.83 They are the rights (1) to possess; (2) to use; (3) to manage; 
(4) to the income of the thing; (5) to the capital; (6) to security (or immunity from 
expropriation); (7) the rights or incidents of transmissibility; (8) absence of term; (9) 
the prohibition of harmful use; (10) liability to execution; (11) the incident of 
residuarity.84   
 
The right to possess as an incident of ownership seems uncontroversial. Analysis of 
possession is not offered here but Honoré suggests this means exclusive control and 
a claim that others without permission should not interfere. The synthesis between 
the incidents is apparent, as an example those of residuarity and income; viz if a 
freeholder has granted a 999 year lease out of his fee simple, his right to physical 
possession and exclusive control is severely limited. Yet he retains the powers and 
rights (and obligations) of a landlord, he is entitled to receive the rent, he is entitled to 
the reversion and he has the right to possess and exclusively control his freehold, 
(subject to the lease). The lease could only be granted in exercise of his rights and 
with his consent, it did not exist prior to the exercise of the rights of the owner.85 Such 
freeholds are traded for value. It is rational to recognise the right to possess even 
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when the res is merely a residuarity. It is a further incident of ownership that there is 
a correlative right to recover possession from a wrongful dispossessor86 – the point is 
that present physical control may be probative but is not conclusive. The availability 
of these remedies demonstrates recognition of ownership in English law.   
 
Immediate right to possession does not necessarily entail a right to recover or protect 
it. Where X loans Blackacre to Y for a week’s holiday, Y (who possesses under 
licence) has a right to a species of possession. He has no protective claim, save for 
damages. The absence of trespassory rules excludes proprietary protection. This is 
uncontroversial amongst jurists, save the distinction drawn by Penner that the right to 
possession may be subsumed under the right to exclusive use; this is the core of his 
‘anti-bundle’ definition of property.87 Harris posits an ownership spectrum, ranging 
from ‘mere property’ to ‘full blooded ownership’ on which possession lies at the lower 
end.88 This has merit, protected possession may not entail other incidents of 
ownership but enjoy protection nonetheless. Further, adverse possession is capable 
of maturing into ‘full blooded ownership’. The significance of possession justifies 
abstracting notions of the right to possession from Penner’s supervening ‘exclusive 
use’ criteria. 
Honoré suggests coalescence between the right to use, manage and to income. This 
is rational - generation of income and management of property is clear use of it. As in 
Roman law, this is not an unqualified right unrestricted by state regulation. Without 
state protection, the concept of ownership is meaningless. With state protection 
freedom to use is curtailed. Were Y not forbidden to use his bulldozer to trespass on 
and raze Blackacre, X (as its owner) could not be said to have any meaningful 
property in Blackacre. The incidental prohibition from harmful use is thus made out. 
This suggests that the right to the use is better described as a right to the non-
interference of permitted enjoyment. This represents the question of whether the right 
or the duty is analytically prior. It may be objected that for a duty to be analytically 
prior to the right, there is necessarily an assumption that all property is owned. This 
need not be the case. Property is distinct from the right; property may well exist prior 
to right(s) of ownership. If a property right is conceived of as a legally significant 
event, viz it has been acquired through some just and recognised means, then the 
duty is capable of being engaged. The right does not entail the duty (which may be 
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said to exist in rem), it grounds the claim to benefit from the duty in the form of a new 
in personam claim, leaving the higher right and duty intact. Otherwise, there would be 
a presumption in favour of a dispossessor that all property is vulnerable to acquisition 
by another unless the owner, or person with a better claim, stands continuously 
prepared to assert his rights. This is not unrecognisable (pace relativity of title) but for 
the subtle difference that the assimilation of such a presumption would have a 
probative effect which would destroy the notion of protected property institutions. 
 
The right to manage is abstracted from the supervening right to use for the following 
analysis. The owner of property may grant both proprietary and non-proprietary 
interests, for example leases or licences. This introduces the question of bundles of 
rights. If a lease or licence is created by an owner, (his power to do so is an incident 
of ownership, little turns here on whether this incident is abstracted from others) then 
the question is has a right been created de novo (the anti-bundle view) or has the 
owner transferred one of his existing rights to another? The answer lies in a 
synthesis between the two theoretical solutions; by granting a right the owner has 
created a new bundle of rights, the owner of the new right (the transferee of part of 
the old) is subject to the (new bundle of) incidents of ownership so far as they attach 
to the right he has acquired. To this end, the right is de novo. This is incomplete, the 
transferor can only have effected this by the transfer of one of his existing rights. All 
the time the res is not destroyed, the use-right transferred is not destroyed but no 
longer lies with the transferor. If the transfer is a legally significant event which 
creates a new right in rem which (in deference to Hohfeldian principles) creates a 
new aggregate of rights and remedies of which one is the transferred right, then the 
two arguments coalesce. This issue manifested in Roman law, in the question 
whether or not dominium was conceptually transferred and a new dominium created 
as a result of the transfer of an existing right, or if the dominium itself was transferred. 
Classical and Justinianic jurists spoke of both translatio rei and proprietatem 
transferre, the latter of which suggests transfer of the right.89 The significance of this 
is seen in adverse possession.  No new easements can arise on creation of a 
possessory title. Title acquired by adverse possession may be considered a statutory 
title but, it is de novo, not a statutory conveyance; there is no disposition and no 
easement can arise by implication or operation of law. This suggests that there is, in 
consensual dispositions, transfer of an existing right. Penner objects that the 
corollary is there are sufficient rights in any bundle of ownership that everyone may 
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be licenced to do everything by an owner; but, unless the licence was entirely 
revocable this would amount to abandonment. If Penner’s argument is considered to 
its logical conclusion, there is only one right, that of ownership. An owner may do all 
or nothing with his property. Penner says ‘anything or nothing’ but this is not what his 
argument permits.90 
 
The right to income is largely self-explanatory other than to observe that income may 
sometimes take the form of a claim in rem (the fruits and certain profits) and 
sometimes in personam, particularly when in the form of money. It is worth 
abstracting this from the right to use, because it is comparable to the ius fructum in 
Roman law. 
 
The right to the capital in a res is important in economical terms. It permits disposition 
for consideration such as sale, legacy, gratuitous transfer or mortgage. These 
powers are central to a liberal construction of ownership and are a core value in a 
free market economy.  Conceptually, however, ownership does not entail the power 
of disposition, for example in estates ‘owned’ by the National Trust the core 
properties are inalienable.  Penner incorporates this in the right to exclusive use. His 
objection is that Honoré reduces the right to distinctions that are drawn between 
different uses.91 This is specious and unsatisfactory; such distinctions may be made 
in respect of state regulations to control harmful uses or even to assign regulations 
and behaviour to particular branches of the law. Honoré examines a normative and 
doctrinal distinction identifying a key characteristic in ownership, resembling ius 
abusus in Roman law. 
 
Liability to execution should be considered alongside the right to the capital. Without 
this incident, the growth of credit would be impeded and ownership capable of being 
deployed as a means of defrauding creditors.92 It is difficult to reconcile this liability 
with the concept that there should be an advantage to the right-holder connected to 
the obligation.93 However, the capital value becomes economically sterilised if the 
right holder cannot expose it to such risks. Furthermore, where it is liable to 
execution to recover unsecured debts, then this surely is a manifestation of the 
entitlement to the capital. Otherwise, a diligent debtor seeking to discharge his 
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liabilities could not enjoy the benefit of liquidating assets to meet them – a clear 
disadvantage. Between liability to execution and the right to the capital lies the 
incident of transmissibility. The fee simple becoming heritable marked a shift towards 
modern notions of private ownership in English law and eroded the distinction 
between civil and common law conceptions of property. 
 
The intractable question is, which of these incidents are necessary and sufficient to 
establish ownership. What Honoré refers to as residuary character might establish an 
irreducible minimum in ownership and represent the characteristic which unites 
Roman and common law. This is cautiously posited, it flies in the face of Honoré’s 
own view that it is merely another standard incident, undeserving of special status. 
Concerned not to confuse expectancy and split ownership with residuarity, he 
analyses emphyteusis and considers the difficulty in whether the owner was the 
reversioner (dominius) or the emphyteuta.94 This is readily answered. In Roman law, 
the owner is dominus. There is no further right behind him, there is behind the 
emphyteuta. It is an empty right, a nudum ius but it is the reversionary right 
nonetheless. The English law position is complicated by the availability of the 
leasehold estate, ownership can be split between freeholder and leaseholder both of 
whom own (a transitive verb which necessarily admits an object) estates. However, if 
residuarity is an incident of ownership then the ultimate owner in English law is the 
freeholder, as the dominus in Roman law. Where subject to a 999 year lease, this 
residuary interest in the freehold reduces to a similarly nudum ius as the dominium 
subject to emphyteusis in Roman law. Honoré wrote without the benefit of the Land 
Registration Act 2002 when relativity of title was more pronounced in English law. On 
either analysis, the incident of residuarity is worthy of greater prominence than 
afforded in the paradigm model of ownership. 
 
Given the cohesion between individual incidents of ownership, it is clear why 
commentators have sought a univocal definition of property. Their definitions 
however do not survive scrutiny, their justification relies on an assimilation of the 
incidents discussed herein. By grouping them under the same genus they help 
themselves to what is at issue, a higher norm capable of reduction to independent 
constituent incidents. Penner’s definition starts ‘The right to property is…’ and is 
followed by a list of divisible rights.95 
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This reveals a universal grammar in property. The distinctions between civil and 
common law property systems are beyond doubt; but the similarities are illuminating 
and suggest the distinction is one of form not substance. From both systems 
emerges an organising idea or higher order of norm. As to the former, the idea 
directs a legal system to respond to the need to organise the allocation of material 
resources. As to the latter, ownership may be regarded as a unifying concept. This 
might be the correlation between individual names and objects, the organisation of 
which is a matter for individual legal systems. The response of the legal systems is a 
conceptualisation of the higher concept.96 
 
The resulting structure, particularly in Anglo-American common law, has prompted 
jurists to lament the disintegration of property and the death of ownership and 
redundancy of the term ‘property’.97  Indeed, in litigation a claim to ownership is not 
set up. A litigant simply seeks to prove, and a practitioner only interested in, whether 
his right is relatively better than that of his opponent. It is an inevitable consequence 
of the development of capitalism that as the marketplace has evolved (particularly 
intellectual property), as financial institutions and instruments, corporations, trade 
mechanisms and other sophisticated divisions of resources have developed, the law 
of property has responded by facilitating the division of assets, distribution of claims 
and ordering of security. The bundle of rights making up the system of property may 
be seen less as a hangover from feudal tenure fuelled by archaic doctrine and more 
the logical and sophisticated exercise by the state of a liberal facilitative approach to 
the regulation of private property. Yet the rhetorical power of the lay notion of 
property pervades and the superior normative weight of abstract property remains 
intact. 
 
3     On the Justification of Private Property 
The starting point is the doctrine of first possession which features prominently in 
both common law and in the Roman law viz acquisition of a res nullius. The effect of 
the doctrine in both systems is to give rise to an original acquisition being regarded 
as a root of title. Distinction must be made between property which belongs to no one 
and property which belongs to everyone;98 in Roman law this was the identification of 
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res commune and other species of property which were not vulnerable to private 
acquisition.99 What is sought, is the justification for deriving a juridical right from first 
acquisition in order to protect it. 
 
There are various canonical theories explaining justice in acquisition (and 
preservation). In contemporary literature at least, these may be described as (1) the 
labour theory (which reduces into the ‘why-not’ labour theoryand the labour-desert 
theory);100 (2) utility (which incorporates or divides over economic efficiency and 
social stability); and (3) political liberty viz the notion that, if property acquisition is 
inevitable human behaviour then it would be a curtailment of freedom to prevent it.101 
Something must be said of natural arguments, those which concern property outside 
(or prior to) the legal system. 
 
Much literature seeks a dominant theory. Even where a pluralist theory is posited or a 
presumption that each theory carries equal weight, the inherent difficulty remains that 
where the differing theories are complementary other, they also conflict; 
reconciliation is the intractable problem. 
 
Locke, the progenitor of the labour theory of primitive acquisition, suggests isolating 
the property in an individual’s labour in themselves and the mixing of their labour with 
a thing so as to ‘change … it from its natural state’ makes the thing their property, 
subject to the qualification that ‘at least where there is enough and as good left in 
common for others.’102 Elements of this theory are compatible with other theoretical 
propositions. The idea of making use of a resource is inherently utilitarian. If 
considered in terms of the labour-desert proposition that a person deserves reward 
for production of resources which may be used by others, it is not a great stretch of 
the imagination to recognise some hint of capitalist economic efficiency. The 
qualification may be reconciled with concepts of pareto optimality and thus economic 
theory. At its most literal, Locke’s theory is not infallible. Rather than the mixing of 
labour being acquisitive of property, it might be divestitative of labour.103 Locke’s 
justification is that it is a matter of justice that labour should be rewarded.104 The 
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utility and economic benefit in engaging resources and encouraging the investment 
of labour is a similar justification, suggesting synthesis between the theories.  
 
Locke posited that private property exists prior to state and regulation and is a 
principle of natural justice.105 It is objected that there cannot exist in nature as 
concise a definition of property as that offered by a system of law. This proposition 
stands for itself. If nature provided a rational system of regulation then civilised 
society would not take the form it does. A more promising argument is that the 
introduction of money and market forces facilitated inequality. Thus, the power of 
natural property norms became vulnerable to acquisitive human behaviour. This is 
consistent with the germination of capitalism or the development of political self-
consciousness and a move towards the social contract.106 Property, even in a 
primitive form is conceivable in the state of nature. Therefore, it may be regarded as 
a higher norm the legal structuring of which is a response. 
 
Were property to exist in a state of nature then there must be some consent amongst 
individuals, at least some tacit recognition of and respect for de facto possession. 
Proponents of this view suggest this consent created title.107 Locke considered this 
impractical;108 two objections arise. Firstly, consent need not be a positive expression 
given by all mankind. It may be passive acquiescence;109 indeed acquiescence is of 
normative significance in prescriptive acquisition of easements. It also formed the 
basis of acquisition of a res nullius or res derelicta in Roman law. Secondly, arguably 
first possession is not true ownership until it is validated by transfer to another. The 
justification being that the original possessor’s worth is grounded in the common will 
of both possessor and transferee.110 Consent to ownership, or recognition of 
ownership by others grounds title. 
 
This is insufficient justification. It advances sound argument for the protection of de 
facto possession but, whilst the labour theory is not unmeritorious, there is nothing 
within it which necessarily institutes private property.   
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Hegel offers insight here, suggesting that without property, an individual is an 
abstract personality. Acquisition of property is a necessary expression of his will into 
the external world. Every individual has an absolute right to acquisition. Acquisition of 
property is thus the perfection of the will of the individual, who is a free will when he 
achieves ownership.111 This underlines the importance of property as a genus of 
political freedom and in so doing elevates the normative status of ownership. 
Philosophically, property is a relation which exists inchoately prior to the law – the 
legal system evolves to recognise and perfect the relationship and the personality of 
the individual.112 
 
Theories of utility offer justification. Property rights are a necessary means of human 
happiness.113 References to pleasure and happiness abound the orthodox utilitarian 
commentary but should be regarded cautiously. Munzer proposes preference-
satisfaction as a more tangible end.114 This is more appropriate terminology in 
contemporary analysis. The advantage is that this serves to reduce subjective 
speculation about what happiness or pleasure really is, or should be; it is easier to 
reconcile arguments about economic efficiency and optimality with standards of 
preference satisfaction, not to mention an inherent reasonableness in drawing 
together utility-efficiency arguments with Rawlsian notions of rationality (it is noted 
that Rawls rejects the suggestion that individuals in the original position would adopt 
utility but it is suggested with the refinement proposed and the assimilation with 
efficiency, the theories may be compatible) and optimality in distributive justice. 
 
A criticism of utilitarianism is that it ignores distinctions between individuals; the 
doctrine ‘trades-off’ the happiness of one individual for the happiness of the majority. 
More guarded criticism recognises the teleological underpinnings of traditional 
utilitarianism as a proponent of individual liberties but nonetheless criticises the 
conflation of preferences as if they were a whole.115 Yet if utilitarianism is founded on 
the notion of happiness and preference satisfaction, how can it be measured if not by 
the satisfaction of individual preferences?116 Society as a whole cannot be satisfied 
without the satisfaction of its individual constituents. Further, it is difficult to reconcile 
Rawls’ criticism with the distributive theory of justice and fairness he proposes. He 
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assumes that persons in the original position would ‘choose a principle of equal 
liberty and restrict economic … inequalities … it is not impossible that the most good 
is produced but it would be a coincidence.’ This is incompatible with arguments in 
favour of distributive pareto optimality advanced later in his treatise and his analysis 
of the rationality of the original parties.117 
 
Returning to Becker’s utility argument, the suggestion is that security of possession 
and use must be enforced and modes of acquisition controlled to facilitate acquisition 
and preservation of things and thus maximise social satisfaction. This is proved in 
that a lack of security of possession and uncontrolled acquisition would cause 
instability. The organising idea behind this protective and facilitative system is one of 
private property and a system of private property rights is justified. 
 
The appeal of the utilitarian argument is that not only does it justify the institution of 
property, the abstract protection of possession, use and any other incidents, but also 
the rights, practices, juridical procedures and the like.118 In a capitalist or free market 
society, this is crucial. 
 
Utility based arguments may be reduced further as to economic utility119 and 
efficiency.120 Both are considered against the concept of Pareto optimality and Pareto 
superiority.121 Let there be two states of affairs (here this may be differing allocation 
of property rights) S1 and S2.122 S2 will be Pareto superior if moving to this state from 
the former will increase the welfare (preference-satisfaction) of at least one 
individual, without decreasing the preference-satisfaction of any individual. Either 
state will be Pareto optimal where it exists and it is impossible to change to another 
state to increase the preference satisfaction of any individual without decreasing the 
preference satisfaction of at least one individual. This system avoids conflation of 
preferences which grounds the criticism of utilitarianism considered earlier. 
 
This is not a sufficient justification for the institution of private property or the 
individual distribution of it, which must admit normative and other principles in order 
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to be just.123 Rawls suggests it cannot stand alone as a principle of justice.124 Becker 
identifies a serious flaw; if property is designed as a coercive institution then where a 
state sanctioned change is implemented in the name of efficiency, property rights 
may be vulnerable to all manner of interference. This undermines what is in issue– 
any meaningful recognition of property and ownership.125 This objection might be met 
by the assimilation of utility based and efficiency based arguments.  If part of utility is 
protection of rights then it is simply given priority over efficiency based arguments for 
systemic reconstructions. If Pareto tests are applied then it need be the case that 
only one individual’s welfare is reduced and there is no justification for the change (at 
least none which is derived from the argument), even were the rest of the world to be 
advantaged. This suggests efficiency forms a useful balance against utility and 
combining the two justifies public and private property.126 
 
Utility and efficiency arguments are compatible with arguments from political liberty, 
which offer a general account of why people should have the opportunity to have 
private property to enjoy, for example, their individualism, privacy and reasonable 
levels of freedom.127 This concept of political liberty absorbs Hegel’s suggestion that 
the acquisition of property completes the personality of the individual.128 
 
The foregoing analysis points to an emerging pluralism (quare eclecticism) in 
justificatory theories in property discourse.   
 
Concluding Remarks 
Theories of property present inconsistencies and conflicting justifications. A rejection 
of the orthodox view on the structure of ownership emerges in the literature, yet it 
does not survive scrutiny. From the foregoing analysis has emerged a universal 
grammar in property discourse, a system of logic which, as Lawson found, is 
unmatched elsewhere.129 There are features remarkably similar in otherwise distinct 
legal systems which ground unity. The Roman law and Anglo American common law 
appear to differ more in form than substance. Throughout this discussion, property 
has been isolated as a genus of higher norm. 
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A sensible justification of private property must strike a balance between political 
prescription and sociological description. The last two centuries provide a wealth of 
evidence to inform reflective rather than prescriptive accounts of the reality of 
property. 
 
The traditional narrative, whilst outmoded and lacking in the conceptual 
sophistication necessary for reconciliation with the political, social and economic 
exigencies of contemporary free market society, provides a doctrinal background 
which has survived changing legal and social landscape. Yet the more promising 
justificatory framework is pluralist. 
 
The unification of property theory lies not in some panacea which emasculates all 
prior rhetoric, nor in any narrow criticism of the canons of analysis; but rather in a 
contextual and cohesive reconstruction of an institution of venerable heritage, 
drawing on the plurality of concepts which despite their inconsistencies are 
irreducible – a focus instead on reconciliation. 
 
Property has evolved. It is not the disintegration of property that should excite 
academic debate, but the synthesis. 
